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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

Case Number: 20151069-CA

NATHAN SEXTON
Defendant/ Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a class B
misdemeanor and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in the
Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable, Joseph Bean, Judge,
presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences and
refused to give credit for time served.
a. Standard of Review: This court reviews a decision to impose
.._d

consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright 893
P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion
results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant
[sentencing] factors,"' (State v. McCov/lJ', 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah
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1990) (citation omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give
'adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances."' State v. Helms,
2002 UT 12, 115, 40 P.3d 626 (citation omitted).
a. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Sexton asked the court to impose
concurrent sentences. R. 52:7-8, 10. He also asked the court to give
him credit for the time he had served. R. 52:11-12.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are m
Addendum A and B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 25, 2015 the State charged Mr. Sexton with a class A
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance inside a correctional facility and
a class B misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1-2. On October 22,
2015, the parties negotiated a settlement where Mr. Sexton pied to an amended
count 1 as a class B misdemeanor and count 2 as charged. R. 24-25; 52. The court
imposed sentence that same date. Id. The judgment was filed on October 29,
2015. R. 26-27. On November 20, 2015, Mr. Sexton filed a pro-se notice of
appeal to this court. R. 2 9.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State charged Mr. Sexton with possessing a bag of spice, and a lighter
and some papers while he was in a correctional treatment facility, NUCCC. R.

2

52:5. At the time, he was on parole which led to a violation of his parole and a
return to prison. R. 52:7-8. At the change of plea hearing, held October 22, 2015,
Mr. Sexton pled to two amended class B misdemeanors. R. 52:3-7. The court told
Mr. Sexton that it "is possible that the Court could impose

a

consecutive sentence.

I normally don't do that. I normally go concurrent, but you need to understand

that it is a possibility." R. 52:6-7.
·11/}

Mr. Sexton asked the court to impose concurrent sentences given that this
conduct violated his parole and returned him to the prison. R. 52:7-8. "[I]t's really
all the same offense," counsel pointed out. R. 52:8. The State disagreed, noting
that "[t]he presumption under the statute for an offense committed while on
parole is that they run consecutively." R. 52:8, 9. Mr. Sexton pointed out that he
was actually on probation at the time:

I was actually on a charge -- they didn't send me to prison. They put
me on probation to go to NUCCC and then I violated more than
once. And then that's why they decided to drop my probation,. and
that's what sent me to prison. I hadn't been to prison yet by that
time.
R. 52:9. The State asked the court to "send a message that we're going to run
those consecutive when somebody possesses a controlled substance while in
NUCCC." R. 52:9. An agent indicated that Mr. Sexton had four attempts to
complete programming at NUCCC. R. 52:10-11. Mr. Sexton asked the court to
run it concurrently so that he could do his time in prison and then "get out and get
a job and progress my life." R. 52: 10.
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The court responded that it could "authorize (the sentence] to be served at
the prison" rather than at the jail. R. 52: 10. It imposed 180 days on each count to
be seived concurrently with each other but consecutively to his prison sentence. R.
52: 11. The court allowed the sentence to be seived at the prison, but refused to
give Mr. Sexton credit for the four months he had already served for the crime. R.
52:11-12. The court indicated that Mr. Sexton had had "a lot of opportunities
given to you," but understood that "addiction is tough," and was "a very difficult
thing." R. 52: 12. The court continued,
You got to make some wise choices when you're out on the street.
Most people when they are standing where you're standing, they
really are determined to stay clean, and I'm sure you're feeling the
same. And it's tough when people have it all around you. You've got
to figure out some tools to be able to resist that and make better
choices.
I think everybody wants to see you be successful, but you're the one
that's got to make those choices when the chips are done, when it's
tough. I've given you kind of a middle-of-the-road sentence instead
of going as harsh as the State wants. I haven't gone quite that harsh,
but I haven't been as lenient either as [defense counsel] or you would
like me to be, but it is to send you a message that we've got to try and
clean it up. It's got to start somewhere. And I'm not saying it's
starting with you, but you're one of those that we're going to get
relatively tough on if you're taking that into NU CCC.
R. 52: 12-13.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously sentenced Mr. Sexton to a consecutive sentence
without considering three major facts: first, the offense he committed was relatively
minor: the possession of a substance which is not even listed as a controlled
substance in Utah and it had no victims. Second, he had already received an
extensive punishment. Third, Mr. Sexton had strong rehabilitative needs. He
exhibited all the problems with the disease of chronic drug dependency, and the
court rather simplistically asserted that he had the choice to not relapse and to not
reoffend. These three errors amounted to an abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
The trial court abused its discretion in hnposing a
consecutive jail sentence on top of the prison tune Mr.
Sexton was already serving, given the offense's lack of
seriousness and Mr. Sexton's rehabilitative needs

The trial court failed to fully appreciate three facts: 1) that Mr. Sexton's
offense was relatively minor; 2) that he had already been punished extensively and
3) that the realities of drug addiction, which the court acknowledged, would
account for multiple relapses. Therefore, the court failed to consider the statutory
factors of gravity and circumstances of the offense, the lack of victim, and Mr.
Sexton's rehabilitative needs. Additionally, although the statute presumes the
imposition of a consecutive sentence, the court erred in failing to find a consecutive
sentence inappropriate in Mr. Sexton's situation.

5

A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the
judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly
excessive sentence.""' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (citation
omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally
relevant [sentencing] factors,"' McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235 (quoting State v. Gibbons,
779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial judge fails
to give adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances."' Helms, 2002 UT 12
at 1 15 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)) This court will find a
trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651
(quotation omitted).
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more
than one felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,

1 48,

52 P.3d 451.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 outlines the factors a trial court must consider before
determining whether to impose a consecutive sentence with the important caveat
that " [c] oncurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT
App 211 at 1 43 (citations omitted).
Section 76-3-401 states in part the following:
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); see also Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ,I 9. The statute also
states that the court "shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would

be inappropriate." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(3).
Utah courts have found violations of these principles in a few cases. For
example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), the trial court's consecutive
sentence failed to account for the defendant's rehabilitative needs. Id. at 244-45.
Even though Smith was convicted of serious crimes (aggravated kidnapping, rape
of a child, and sodomy on a child), and several factors weighed in favor of
consecutive sentences (heinousness, pedophilia, and the defendant's lack of
treatment), the court's failure to consider his rehabilitative needs required a new
sentencing hearing. Id. at 238, 244-455.
Similarly, in Gall~ the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to
consider mitigating circumstances. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Galli was convicted of
three counts of aggravated robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three
years before being sentenced. See id. at 932. The supreme court held that the trial
court abused its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences because: (1) the
trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain mitigating
circumstances," including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any physical
injuries," only used a "pellet gun," and took a relatively small" amount of money;
(2) the defendant's history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one
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misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding only provided "nominal
support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although the defendant's
"offenses and flight from justice reflected negatively on his character," he
"voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed a commitment and
hope t_o improve himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his
neighbors, and was a productive individual"; and (4) concurrent sentencing "better
serve [ed]" his "rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole
to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine progress toward
rehabilitation." Id. at 938; see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah
1993) (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing 16-year-old convicted of
murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to consecutive
sentences even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of
imprisonment" because trial court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a
minimum of twenty-four years in prison," failed to "sufficiently consider
defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of
prior violent crimes," and "rob[bed] the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to
parole [defendant] sooner").
In Perez, this court found that a trial court erred when it sentenced the
defendant consecutively without any indication that it had considered any of the
statutory factors other than the "gravity and circumstances of the offense." Id. at 1
48. In Perez, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated burglary, a firstdegree felony and attempted murder, a second-degree felony. Id. at

8

1 20.

On

appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive
prison terms without considering all of the required statutory factors. Id. at, 42.
Perez's presentence report recommended that he serve concurrent prison terms
and the prosecutor agreed with that recommendation. Id. at, 44. Even though the
trial court found that Perez's conduct was "egregious" and admittedly touched on
the "gravity and circumstances of the offense," its consecutive sentence was
inappropriate. Id. at 45. This was because the court "did not explicitly address the
presentence report's recommendation of concurrent sentences." Id at , 48.
Because nothing in the record indicated that the trial court ""consider[ed] the ...
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences," the trial court erred. Id. (citation
omitted).
When a trial court does not make findings as to the basis for the imposition
of consecutive sentences and the consideration as to relevant factors, appellate
courts will uphold the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences if it is
,,J)

reasonable to assume that the court considered all appropriate factors. Helms, 2002
UT 12 at ,r 11; State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, 194 P.3d 195. Appellate courts
will not, however, assume that the trial court considered all required factors and

made appropriate findings in circumstances where the record does not support
such findings. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ,r 11.

9

The record in this case does not demonstrate that the trial court adequately
considered three issues: the relative significance of the crime, the punishment he
had already received, as well as the realities of drug addiction.

A. THE GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE WERE
FAIRLY MINOR AND THERE WERE NO KNOWN VICTIMS.

Utah has only recently criminalized the possession of spice, 1 but the
literature supports the fact that we no little of its actual effects on humans. "Spice
and its psychoactive constituents, synthetic cannabinoids, represent an increasingly

1 It

should be noted that the substance Mr. Sexton possessed, AB-CHMINACA, is
not listed on the list of controlled substances in Utah. See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-374.2. Mr. Sexton did not challenge this fact prior to his plea, nor did he make the
very reasonable challenge that the substance is not a controlled substance analog
as defined in the code because the literature indicates that there is "no information
is available about in vitro or in vivo human metabolism of AB-CHMINACA."
Claudio Erratico et al., In vitro and in vivo human metabolism of the synthetic cannabinoid
AB-CHMINACA, 7 Drug Testing and Analysis 866-876 (2015).
If challenged, the State would have to prove that AB-CHMINACA was
substantially similar to a prohibited substance, something that appears to be
unsupported at this time. See State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, 120, 343 P.3d 709
("the State was required to provide reasonably believable evidence that [a
controlled substance analog's] chemical structure was 'substantially similar' to [a
controlled substance's] chemical structure and that [the controlled substance
analog] either had a substantially similar effect as (the controlled substance] or was
'represented or intended' to have such an effect").

Mr. Sexton waived these challenges by virtue of his plea, nor does there appear to
be a misplea or illegal sentence, since there would be at least a reasonable dispute
about whether AB-CHMINACA is a controlled substance analog. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-2. These matters may be properly resolved in a post-conviction
proceeding. However, for purposes of this appeal, this court should use this
information as evidence that AB-CHMINACA was a relatively minor controlled
substance as it relates to the gravity of the offense for sentencing. See discussion
infra.
10

popular trend in substance use for which researchers and clinicians have inszifficient

data." 2
There are no randomized controlled trials for Spice. Furthermore,
few of the synthetic cannabinoids have been tested on humans
(Auwarter et al. 2009). Most of the information on Spice is
anecdotal-from internet forums, calls to emergency responders and
Poison Control Centers, and case reports in the medical literature.
To what extent the available literature accurately represents the
phenomenon of Spice is unclear. 3
Even the "prevalence of psychotic reactions is not clear [from Spice use] and
surveys of Spice users have yielded inconsistent results. " 4
Clearly, the legislature has prohibited the product, and there are anecdotal
indications of its hallucinogenic effects, but nonetheless, the possession of the
substance was a relatively minor offense. It is classified as a Class A misdemeanor,
not at the felony level like other major drugs. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2). And
while it may have addictive qualities, it has not been shown to have near the
addictive qualities of other harmful drugs, like methamphetamine or heroin. 5
Additionally, no one was victimized by the offense. Therefore, two of the factors
the legislature has asked courts to consider do not support the imposition of
consecutive sentences.

al., Spicing thing
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 525-540 (2013)
2

3
4

Max

Spadema

et

up:

Synthetic

cannabinoids,

228

Id.
Id.

5

Marisol S. Castaneto et al., Synthetic cannabinoids: Epidemiology, pharmacodynamics, and
clinical implications, 144 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 12-41 (2014)
11

B.

WHILE MR. SEXTON HAD A HISTORY OF NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH PROBATION, THIS WAS DUE TO HIS STRUGGLES WITH
DRUG ADDICTION, WHICH THE COURT ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT
IT ERRED IN OVERLY PUNISHING HIM FOR THE OFFENSE.

By the time Mr. Sexton was sentenced for possession of the spice, he had
been arrested, violated on his parole, returned to prison and done four months in
custody. R. 52:7-9. 11-12. The court gave him six months and he had already
served two-thirds of that sentence. It was likely that he would do significantly more
time in prison for what the legislature has deemed to be a relatively minor offense.
Mr. Sexton clearly was heavily punished for having spice in his room and the
court's imposition of additional jail or prison time for this offense (by imposing a
consecutive sentence) improperly and overly relied on his lack of success at
probation. His failures, however, are common with drug addicts.
The trial court failed to properly account for Mr. Sexton's rehabilitative
needs, even though it acknowledged that "addiction is tough," and was "a very
difficult thing." R. 52:12. The sentence reflects that the court failed to appreciate
that most offenders will relapse and will relapse on multiple occasions during their
struggle with addiction.
Drug addiction is a serious disease and there is an extremely high likelihood
of relapse among addicts. "Not long ago, discussions about relapse were
categorically avoided in addiction treatment programs [for]

fear □

that discussing

the possibility of relapse would only make it more likely to happen .... Now it is

12

openly acknowledged by addiction treatment professionals that relapses can and
do happen. " 6
One national study showed that after five years of successfully completing
rehabilitative treatment for drug dependency, only 21 percent actually reported
reduced usage, meaning that 79 percent of treated offenders relapsed. 7 Of a group
of 967,012 drug users completing treatment, the study found that only 155,689
individuals were able to successfully avoid a relapse. 8 "Following treatment for
chemical dependency or substance abuse, individuals experience a high relapse
rate. Relapse rates vary from one treatment program to another but these rates
can be as high as 90 percent." 9 According to another researcher, "[a]pproximately
two-thirds of clients will use their drugs of choice within a year of leaving
treatment." 10 The period soon after leaving treatment is the period "of highest risk,
and it needs the greatest attention." 11

6

ARNOLD M. WASHTON &JOANE. ZWEBEN, COCAINE & METHAMPHETAMINE
ADDICTION: TREATMENT, RECOVERY, AND RELAPSE PREVENTION 153 0/'f. W.
Norton & Company) (2009)
7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AMONG ADOLESCENTS (Dept. of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration) (1999) ("Those using any illicit drug
decreased from 75 percent before treatment to 59 percent after treatment")
B

Id.

STEPHANIE L. BROOKE, THE USE OF THE CREATIVE THERAPIES WITH
CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY ISSUES 139-40 (Charles C Thomas Publisher) (2009);
William A. Hunt et al., Relapse rates in addiction programs, 27 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 455-456 (1971); GRIFFITH EDWARDS & MALCOLM HAROLD
LADER, ADDICTION: PROCESSES OF CHANGE (Oxford University Press) (1994)
lo ROBERT R. PERKINSON, CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY COUNSELING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 130 (SAGE) (2011)
11 Id. at 130
9
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Clearly, the court understood that addictive behavior was difficult. But
rather than sentencing according to that understanding, the court made several
erroneous observations. The court told Mr. Sexton that he had the obligation to
find to overcome the addiction himself: "You've got to figure out some tools to be
able to resist that and make better choices," and "you're the one that's got to make
those choices when the chips are done, when it's tough," it said. R. 52: 12. While
Mr. Sexton does bear some personal responsibility for drug use, the scientific
community strongly recognizes that relapses and reoffending are merely part of
dealing with addiction.
The court's admonition that he must simply choose not to relapse is not
supported by the literature, indeed by virtually any scholar in the medical
community. As one scholar put it, it's not that people lack the choice to use, it's
that the choice not to use causes them to seriously suffer. As he puts it, drug users
begin to have "diminished voluntary control over the frequency and quantity of
drugs taken, 'craving'-persistent, intrusive thoughts about drug use that
complicate efforts to abstain." A drug user "can't choose from day to day not to
have the habit and the cravings that help maintain it":
Even in the absence of marked withdrawal symptoms, their cravings
can make quitting very hard and relapse after quitting a continuing
threat.
Most people don't have such drug habits, no one wants to have such
a drug habit, and the habit can't just be wished away.

14

And the problem-even in those cases when the attempt to abstain
after a period of use leads to physical discomfort-is largely in the
brain ... [I]f all problematic drug using careers consisted of a single
spell of excessive use followed by withdrawal and abstinence
thereafter, there wouldn't be enough of a drug problem to write
books about. It's the persistent craving-which can lead to relapse
even after years of abstinence-that makes addiction such a burden.

[F]or someone with a persistent drug craving, the decision not to use
requires effort, and induces suffering, in a way that most consumer
decisions do not. Some chronic drug users are like persistent dieters
who keep gaining back the weight they have lost: their long-term
intention to get clean (or stay slim) loses out, again and again, to the
immediate craving for the next dose or the next ice cream sundae. 12
The idea that "drug abuse is a health problem and should be classified as a
disease" is "widely accepted today among the medical establishment and most
state and federal health agencies." 13 As some preeminent scientists observed,
ordinary people, and unfortunately judges', wrong perceptions of a person's
volition to use drugs has dangerous consequences:
We have learned how some drugs and alcohol can disrupt volitional
mechanisms by hijacking the brain mechanisms involved in seeking natural
reinforcement and weakening brain mechanisms that inhibit these
processes. This new knowledge has started to provide explanations of
why the addicted person relapses even in the face of dire
consequences such as loss of a child's custody or incarceration.
However, despite these advances in understanding the neuroplastic
changes to drugs and alcohol, addicted individuals continue to be
stigmatized by the pernicious yet enduring popular belief that their ajjliction stems
from voluntary behavior. The loss of behavioral control in the addicted
individual should spur a renewed discussion of what constitutes
12 JONATHAN

P. CAULKINS ET AL., DRUG POLICY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO

KNOW (Oxford University Press) (2015)
13 STEVEN BELENKO & CASSIA SPOHN, DRUGS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 47 (SAGE

Publications) (2014)
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volition, challenge us to identify the neurobiological substrates that
go hayvvire, and influence our evolving strategies to direct our efforts
to prevent and treat substance abuse and addiction more
effectively. 14
In a comprehensive literature review done by the American Medical
Association,

the

scientists

concluded after exammmg diagnoses,

genetic

heritability, the role of personal responsibility, pathophysiology, untreated persons,
medication effectiveness, and medical treatment options that "[d]rug dependence
should be insured, treated, and evaluated like other chronic illnesses" rather than
as a personal choice. 15 Sadly, the trial court failed to treat Mr. Sexton's behavior as
mere symptoms of his disease.
The court also wrongfully decided that Mr. Sexton's sentence should
involve sending a message to others not to use drugs while in treatment. The
purpose of the sentence, it put, was "to send you a message that we've got to try
and clean it up. It's got to start somewhere. And I'm not saying it's starting with
you, but you're one of those that we're going to get relatively tough on if you're
taking that into NUCCC." R. 52:12-13.
Again, this comment reflects a serious misunderstanding of how addiction
works. Users are going to relapse. Users will most likely reoffend. Notably,
treatment for chronic drug users "may need to last a lifetime" since "drug

Nora Volkow & Ting-Kai Li, The neuroscience of addiction, 8 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 1429-1430 (2005)
15 McLellan A et al., Drug dependence, a chronic medical illness: Implications for treatment,
insurance, and outcomes evaluation, 284 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION 1689-1695 (2000)
14

16

addiction is a lifelong condition." 16 Giving Mr. Sexton a consecutive sentence to
-~

get tough on others' (including his own) relapses while in treatment, fundamentally
misunderstands the nature of addiction and only punishes a person, rather than
giving him the tools he needs to succeed.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
consecutive sentence. It failed to account for the relatively minor nature of the
offense, the amount of time in custody Mr. Sexton had already served and would
continue to serve for that offense, and for the fact that relapses are common
occurrences in the treatment of addiction.
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ADDENDUMA
Constitutional Provisions

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FIITH .AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
FOURTEENTH.AMENDMENT, SECTION

1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences -- Lintltations -Definition.

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order
ofjudgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each
other; and

(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively,
the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the
later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.

(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (6)(b).

(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;

(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present

sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and
the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial
sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed
prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and

(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose

consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2

MR. SAUNDERS:

3

THE COURT:

4

No. 151902086.

State of Utah versus Nathan Sexton.

Case

Time set for preliminary hearing.

MR. MARSHALL:

5

No. 41, Nathan Sexton.

Your Honor, this is my understanding.

6

We won't need a preliminary hearing.

7

amend Count 1 to a Class B misdemeanor and Mr. Sexton will then

8

plead to the amended Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B

9

misdemeanors.
THE COURT:

10

The State is moving to

Mr. Sexton, it's been reported to the

11

Court that you are willing to waive your preliminary hearing

12

and enter a plea to an amended Count 1, possession or use of a

13

controlled substance within a correctional facility, Class B

14

misdemeanor.

15
16

MR. MARSHALL:

19

(Inaudible) attempt or strike the jail

language, one or the other.

17
18

Is that an attempt or anything like that?

MR. SAUNDERS:

We'll strike the jail language, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

We'll strike the jail language on

20

that one so it will just be a simple use or possession of a

21

controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor, on Count 1.

22

possession of drug paraphernalia, Class B, on Count 2.

23

Is that your understanding?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Use or

Yes.

All right.

Are you under the influence

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

of any prescribed medication or any other substance that would

2

impair your ability to waive your preliminary hearing and enter

3

a plea to the charges?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

No.

Do you suffer any physical or mental

6

disability that would interfere with understanding what's going

7

on today?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

No.

At a preliminary hearing the State has a

10

burden to show probable cause that the crimes alleged against

11

you were committed and that they were committed by you.

12

you willing to waive that probable cause burden?

13

it being Class B does there even need to be a waiver with the

14

amendment?

15

MR. SAUNDERS:

16

THE COURT:

Are

Actually with

Not on a prelim, no, your Honor.

All right.

Is there a written plea

17

agreement?

18

Court that you understand the charges against you.

19

going to do right now -- you're waiving a bunch of rights in

20

changing your plea, rights that are attendant to a trial like

21

cross-examining witnesses, calling witnesses on your own

22

behalf, presumption of innocence and a jury trial.

25

Mr. Sexton, you've represented to the
What I'm

And you understand that you're waiving all of those

23

24

All right.

rights?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, I do.

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

THE COURT:

2

a factual basis for the plea.

3

all the elements of the offense that the State would have to

4

prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

5

that in just a moment.

6

All right.

MR. SAUNDERS:

Mr. Saunders is going to read

Within that factual basis are

And I'll talk to you about

Your Honor, on May 29 th he was an

7

inmate at NUCCC.

He had in his possession basically spice, a

8

controlled substance while within that facility.

9

the factual basis, your Honor.

10

MR. MARSHALL:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SAUNDERS:

13

That would be

It was found in a desk in his room.

Constructive possession then?
Yes, your Honor.

He also had

the

paraphernalia would be the bag that the spice was located in.

14

MR. MARSHALL:

15

Counsel is not speaking into the microphone and the

16

transcriber cannot hear him.

17

MR. SAUNDERS:

18

(Inaudible).

I believe there was another -- did he

not admit, Mr. Marshall?

19

MR. MARSHALL:

(Inaudible).

20

MR. SAUNDERS:

He admitted to possessing.

21

MR. MARSHALL:

And there were matches and

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

MR. MARSHALL:

24
25

There was --

No, I had a lighter, not matches.
Excuse me.

Lighter and some papers,

(inaudible) papers.
MR. SAUNDERS:

That's sufficient.

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Sexton, do you understand

2

that entering these pleas you are admitting to each of the

3

elements of both of those offenses?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

The Class B misdemeanor carrying anywhere

6

from zero to 180 days in jail, anywhere from zero to a thousand

7

dollars in fines.

8

penalties that could be imposed at sentencing?

9

10
11

Do you understand the minimum and maximum

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

I'm assuming that we're going forward

with sentencing today.

Is that correct?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

Yes.

If that happens then, what you've got is

14

a -- normally you'd have no less than two, no more than 45 days

15

to be sentenced.

16

you're not going to have an opportunity to think about these

17

pleas and then do a motion to withdraw before sentencing

18

because that's the key thing.

19

sentencing.

20

be a post-conviction relief that you'd have to go after rather

21

than a motion to withdraw your plea.

If we go forward with sentencing today,

You've got to do it before

If we go forward with sentencing today, it would

22

Do you understand that?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes, I do.

There's more than one offense here.

It

is possible that the Court could impose a consecutive sentence.
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

I normally don't do that.

I normally go concurrent, but you

2

need to understand that it is a possibility.

3

You understand that?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

Yes,

I do.

All right.

Are you under the influence

6

of any coercion or duress that would make you feel like these

7

pleas are not absolutely voluntarily on your part?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

10

To Count 1, use or possession of a

controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor, how do you plead?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

No.

Guilty.

Sorry?
Guilty.

Thank you.

To Count 2, use or possession

of drug paraphernalia, how do you plead?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

Guilty.

Court will accept those pleas as knowing

18

and voluntarily.

I informed you that you had the right to wait

19

at least two and no more than 45 days for sentencing.

20

wish to waive that two day time period and go forward today?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. MARSHALL:

Sure.

All right.

Do you

Yes, your Honor.
Mr. Marshall, go ahead.

It kind of is what it is at this

24

point, but he is at the prison and I want the Court to know

25

why.

He was on parole.

And because of this, what he's just
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1

pled to, that was also considered a parole violation so the

2

time that he's doing right now is on the parole violation which

3

is essentially the same thing that are these charges.

4

we're asking the Court to of course run the two concurrently

5

with each other, but we'd ask the Court to run the sentence

6

concurrent with the time he's doing in prison right now on the

7

parole violation because it's really all the same offense.
So we're asking the Court to run that all

8

9

concurrently and allow that time to be served at the prison.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. SAUNDERS:

12

And so

Mr. Saunders.
Was the agreement with (inaudible) to

recommend concurrent?

13

MR. MARSHALL:

No.

14

MR. SAUNDERS:

Your Honor, we'd ask the Court then to

15

run them consecutively.

16

the statute for an offense committed while on parole is that

17

they run consecutively.

18
19

THE DEFENDANT:

He's on parole.

The presumption under

But I was on probation and got

paroled (inaudible.)

20

(The defendant is not speaking into a microphone and

21

the transcriber could not hear him.)

22

MR. SAUNDERS:

I don't think so.

He wouldn't have

23

been violated and taken back to prison on a probation

24

violation.

25

THE DEFENDANT:

I never indicated (inaudible.)
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1

MR. SAUNDERS:

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SAUNDERS:

That doesn't make any sense to me.
Well,

I was a county inmate.

Well, it is going to be what it is.
So, your Honor, based on the fact that

5

he is in NUCCC, I am asking the Court to run those

6

consecutively and the fact that he was on parole.
THE COURT:

7
8

Mr. Sexton, I'd like to hear from you.

Go ahead.

9

THE DEFENDANT:

I was actually on a charge -- they

10

didn't send me to prison.

They put me on probation to go to

11

NUCCC and then I violated more than once.

12

they decided to drop my probation, and that's what sent me to

13

prison.

I hadn't been to prison yet by that time.

14

THE COURT:

15

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

16

And then that's why

Okay.
That's right.

He is on

probation right now.

17

MR. MARSHALL:

So that is unusual.

18

MR. SAUNDERS:

I would still say based on fact --

19

this is NUCCC.

20

we have in NUCCC with drugs.

21

send a message that we're going to run those consecutive when

22

somebody possesses a controlled substance while in NUCCC.

23

24
25

The Court hears all the time about the problem

THE COURT:

And I think it's appropriate to

All right.

Anything further, Mr. Sexton?

We kind of -THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah, because this is what -- I've
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1

already done almost four months because of this.

2

would just say please run it concurrent.

3

get my life, you know, over, I mean,

4

and already charges enough.

5

from December 2013 is my original charges and I've been going

6

through all this for quite a while now and I would just ask

7

for, you know, let it go with this because I don't want to go

8

to prison and then just go right back to jail after that.

9

mean I need to get out and get a job and progress my life.

10

THE COURT:

I mean I

I mean I'm trying to

started again, you know,

I've already been -- this is back

I

What does happen as far as where this

11

time is served?

12

parole or his prison time, do they then release him to serve

13

time at Weber County?

14
15
16

If it's consecutive, when he's done with his

MR. SAUNDERS:

He has the option of serving out at

the prison or not, your Honor.
MR. MARSHALL:

17

served at the prison.

18

Court can authorize.

The Court can authorize that to be
It's not the Court's decision, but the

19

THE DEFENDANT:

(Inaudible).

20

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

21

just say something really fast.

22

programming at trying to complete NUCCC.

23

(inaudible) all four times and it's really frustrating because

24

we get a lot of people standing up here saying they don't want

25

to go back to NUCCC because people are bringing drugs in and it

Your Honor, I would like to
This is his fourth attempt at

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT

He's struggled

11

1

really does not help with other people who are trying to be

2

successful and complete their probation.

3

know that his agent did say that all four times he's struggled

4

with this.
THE COURT:

5

All right.

I just wanted you to

The Court will impose the

6

following sentence.

On Count 1, use or possession of

7

controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor, 180 days in the

8

Weber County Jail and on Count 2, use or possession of drug

9

paraphernalia, Class B misdemeanor, 180 days in the Weber

10

County Jail.

11

concurrent with each other but consecutive to your prison

12

sentence.

13
14

15

I am going to order that those be served

THE DEFENDANT:

Then what about the four months I've

already served pretty much because of this charge?
THE COURT:

Well, I don't know that there's credit

16

for time served because you were already in violation of some

17

other sentencing order and I can't give you credit for time

18

that you've served in violation of some other sentencing order

19

which is really what you're doing.

20

THE DEFENDANT:

I mean they had three months to file

21

this before, I mean, I even got -- and they didn't file until

22

four months later, I mean, so I pretty much went to jail

23

because of this charge.

24

MR. MARSHALL:

25

Would Court allow that to be served at

the prison?
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1
2

THE COURT:

Yes, I can allow that.

I won't order,

but I will allow that, yes.
Mr. Sexton, there's some frustration,

3

I think, among

4

AP&P and a lot of the people working with you that you've had a

5

lot of opportunities given to you.

6

tough.

7

We understand addiction is

It's a very difficult thing.
THE DEFENDANT:

(Inaudible).

I mean everybody has it

8

there, you know, and this time it actually wasn't even mine,

9

but it was in my room, but I'm pleading because Class A was

10
11

worse than a Class B but.
THE COURT:

You got to make some wise choices when

12

you're out on the street.

13

where you're standing, they really are determined to stay

14

clean, and I'm sure you're feeling the same.

15

when people have it all around you.

16

some tools to be able to resist that and make better choices.

17

Most people when they are standing

And it's tough

You've got to figure out

I think everybody wants to see you be successful, but

18

you're the one that's got to make those choices when the chips

19

are done, when it's tough.

20

middle-of-the-road sentence instead of going as harsh as the

21

State wants.

22

been as lenient either as Mr. Marshall or you would like me to

23

be, but it is to send you a message that we've got to try and

24

clean it up.

25

it's starting with you, but you're one of those that we're

I've given you kind of a

I haven't gone quite that harsh, but I haven't

It's got to start somewhere.
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1

going to get relatively tough on if you're taking that into

2

NUCCC.
I do wish the best to you, Mr. Sexton.

3

4

work out for you as quickly as possible.

5

your feet back on the road you want to be on.

6

Thank you.

I hope you can get
All right.

7

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

8

MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25
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That the same constitutes a true and correct
transcription of the said proceedings;
That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any
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of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not
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interested in the events thereof.
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WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 22nd day of
January, 2016.
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